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Regulatory failures, split-incentives, conflicting interests and a vicious circle of blame: 
The New Environmental Governance to the rescue? 
 
Abstract 
This article addresses a current trend of new environmental governance (NEG). It examines 
whether NEG is able to overcome a series of complex regulatory barriers and market 
shortfalls that stand in the way of carbon emissions reductions in the building sector. 
Building on an evaluation of 20 NEG arrangements from Australia and the Netherlands, it 
discusses the limits of the effective implementation and use of NEG in this sector. The article 
concludes by suggesting three strategies to improve the performance of NEG arrangements. 
 
1 Introduction 
The shift from government to governance (Rhodes, 1997) is perhaps best visible in the area 
of environmental policy and governance (Jordan, Wurzel, & Zito, 2005). There appears to be 
no limit to the range of innovative types of governance arrangements that scholars have been 
uncovering since the 1990s – e.g., Voluntary Environmental Programmes (Borck & 
Coglianese, 2009), Non-State Market-Driven governance (Cashore, Auld, & Newsom, 2004) 
and Collaborative Environmental Institutions (Lubell, 2004). A recent addition to the 
environmental governance literature is the New Environmental Governance, or NEG 
(Backstrand, Khan, Kronsell, & Lovbrand, 2010; Hoffmann, 2011; Holley, Gunningham, & 
Shearing, 2012). Broadly speaking, NEG includes the addressing of environmental risks by 
collaborations of governmental and non-governmental actors, often through non-mandatory 
approaches (NEG theorising is addressed in more depth in section 3). To date, NEG has 
achieved much acclaim for what it is potentially able to achieve in terms of effective and 
efficient environmental governance (De Búrca & Scott, 2006; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2012). An 
emerging empirical body of literature, however, is critical as to whether NEG is able to 
deliver on its normative expectations (Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Gunningham, 2009; 
Koehler, 2007); and the effectiveness of NEG appears to be highly dependent on the design 
of NEG arrangements and the context they are implemented in (cf., Van der Heijden, 2012). 
Time and again, scholars stress the importance of systematic research into NEG to better 
understand when, where and how its outcomes are caused (Holley, et al., 2012; Wurzel, Zito, 
& Jordan, 2013).  
 Such an understanding is of importance to policymakers and practitioners who seek to 
introduce NEG arrangements themselves. One of the sectors of much NEG activity is the 
2 
 
building sector, in which NEG arrangements are introduced particularly to address the 
sector’s significant contribution to global carbon emissions. As it accounts for over 30% of 
global carbon emissions, it is one of the most carbon intensive sectors in world (Pérez-
Lombard, Ortiz, González, & Maestre, 2009). At the same time, it holds much promise: With 
current knowledge and technologies, these emissions could be reduced by 50% (from 
emissions in 2000) and in a cost-effective way (Newman, Beatley, & Boyer, 2009). The 
building sector seems to offer the most low-cost potential to reduce carbon emissions in all 
world regions by the end of the next decade and is even expected to do so at a net cost benefit 
(IPCC, 2007).  
Unfortunately, a series of regulatory failures and market shortfalls stand in the way of 
governments and market-players that wish to individually exploit the potential the building 
sector offers. It is therefore not surprising that much NEG activity is going on in this sector. 
But what are the outcomes of these NEG arrangements in the building sector? This is the 
central question that drives this research article. Based on a study of 20 NEG arrangements in 
the Australian and Dutch building sectors, it aims to understand whether NEG has kept its 
(normative) promises. In doing so, it seeks to add to the growing empirical knowledge base 
of NEG. Section 2 discusses the various regulatory failures and market shortfalls that stand in 
the way of using the potential of the building sector to reduce carbon emissions. Section 3 
then briefly addresses the current theory about NEG. Section 4 introduces research into the 
20 NEG arrangements, building on interviews with 80 experts involved in these 
arrangements. Finally, in Section 5, the research findings are presented and Section 6 
concludes with the main lessons learnt. 
 
2 Regulatory failures and market shortfalls 
The building sector faces a number of barriers that stand in the way of using the potential it 
holds to reduce carbon emissions. Most significant are regulatory failures that relate to the 
low replacement rates of buildings; and, relatedly, existing property rights. In developed 
economies buildings are constructed with a technical life expectancy of about fifty to a 
hundred years (Fay, Treloar, & Iyer-Raniga, 2000). Yearly, approximately 2% of new 
buildings are added to the existing building stock, which makes for a replacement time of 40 
to70 years (IEA, 2009). Normally, during their lifetime, buildings remain subject to the 
regulatory requirements that were in force when they were first occupied. Existing buildings 
are generally exempted from new or amended building regulations, a process more broadly 
referred to as ‘grandfathering’ (Vinagre Diaz, Wilby, & Belén Rodríguez González, 2013). 
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Thus, it may take a very long time until a regulatory requirement implemented today applies 
to the full (future) building stock – yet, by then, new insights will most likely require 
different regulatory requirements (cf., Newman, et al., 2009).  
When seeking to introduce regulations for future buildings, governments face 
‘classical’ regulatory complexities (for an extensive discussion of public building regulation, 
see Van der Heijden & De Jong, 2009). For instance, the development of building regulation 
is a complicated process due to the important interests that are at stake for various parties. 
Original ambitious regulations may be watered down by the time of implementation as a 
result of mediating between these various interests (Jordan, 1999). Also, governments are 
often unable to keep up with the speed of technological development, which is especially 
relevant in terms of environmental sustainability (Balaras et al., 2007). Finally, the one-size-
fits-all structure of traditional building regulations may go against the idea that attention to 
local circumstances is important for achieving a sustainable built environment (Yudelson, 
2009). 
Not only regulatory failures stand in the way of using the potential the building sector 
holds to reduce carbon emissions. Shortfalls in the (free) market, such as split incentives, 
conflicting interests, and the passing on of responsibilities add to these failures. Split 
incentives are situations where the party paying for the application of a solution does not 
receive the benefits. A typical example is a split incentive between a landlord and a tenant. 
Normally the landlord buys the energy-using equipment and ensures the energy efficiency of 
a building (i.e., the landlord owns the building envelope), and the tenant pays the energy bills. 
This gives the landlord little incentive to make changes to improve the energy-efficiency of 
the building or the equipment therein. Similarly, buildings are normally owned by a sequence 
of owners. Yet, the pay-back time of a solution intended to improve the sustainability of a 
building is often longer than the period an owner owns a building — this holds especially for 
houses. As such the current building owner often has no incentive to make the investment 
because it will be the future owner who gains most from it (Gillingham, Newell, & Palmer, 
2009). 
A further complication is that the building sector is highly fragmented and 
characterised by a wide range of trades, such as architects, engineers, technical advisors, 
contractors, developers, investors, and property owners. These often have their own 
representative bodies, which lobby actively to see their interests served (Lillie & Greer, 
2007). The industry is characterised by a relatively small number of large players (i.e., 
international developers, architectural firms with offices around the globe, dominant 
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construction material producers), and an uncountable number of small players (i.e., locally 
operating contractors, one-man architectural firms, highly specialised building construction 
producers). The interests of the various actors often conflict. A typical example is the 
development of the currently popular best-of-class building benchmarking arrangements (see 
Section 5). By requiring certain construction materials or certain construction processes, such 
arrangements limit market access for some players in the sector, whilst giving others a 
competitive advantage (Beddoes & Booth, 2012). 
Finally, the building sector is often considered to be a highly conservative sector, 
especially in terms of how it addresses environmental sustainability (Rees, 2009). In short, 
although technological solutions are available to reduce the impact the sector has on the 
natural environment, actors in the sector are not particularly willing to replace business-as-
usual technology with this new technology. One particular issue that stands out is the passing 
on of responsibilities by various actors in the sector, sometimes referred to as the ‘vicious 
circle of blame’ (Cadman, 2007). This vicious circle of blame refers to a situation in which 
all parties involved blame each other for not providing, demanding or financing buildings 
with high levels of environmental performance. This suggests, so the argument goes, that 
occupants do not demand sustainable buildings because such buildings are not offered to 
them. Builders, in their turn, do not construct sustainable buildings because developers do not 
commission them. Developers, then, do not commission such buildings because investors do 
not fund them. Finally, investors do not fund sustainable buildings because they hold the 
opinion that there is no demand for these buildings – which brings us back to the occupants. 
This circle of blame has become a strong image in the building sector, with various 
organisations aiming to break it. For instance, the UK based Royal Institute of Chartered 
Surveyors (RICS) aims to change this vicious circle of blame into ‘virtuous loops of feedback 
and adaptation’ (RISC, 2008).  
Both the regulatory failures and the shortfalls of the (free) market are illustrations of 
the difficulties environmental governance has also been unable to overcome in other socio-
technical sectors such as agriculture, transport and energy  (Ten Heuvelhof, de Jong, Kars, & 
Stout, 2009). The current trend for NEG is expected to provide an answer to these issues. It 
should be noted that NEG arrangements are but one of many responses to the regulatory 
failures and market shortfalls discussed in Section 2. For instance, seeking to overcome these 
failures and shortfalls (city) governments are actively collaborating in government-to-
government networks such as ICLEI (Local Governments for Sustainability) and the C40 
Cities Climate Leadership Group (see further, Hoffmann, 2011). It is however not the aim of 
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this article to contrast the performance of NEG arrangements with the performance of other 
responses to the failures and shortfalls identified. 
 
3 NEG: a brief review of the literature and examples 
NEG fits into the discussions that started in the 1990s that build on the idea of a shift from 
government to governance (Rhodes, 1997). NEG is, however, not an approach to governance 
that is easy to capture and it is defined differently in the current literature (e.g., Backstrand, et 
al., 2010; Hoffmann, 2011; Holley, et al., 2012; Wurzel, et al., 2013). Yet some key 
characteristics recur. First, where traditional governance arrangements are often developed 
and implemented by either governmental or non-governmental actors, NEG builds on 
collaboration between the two (Holley, et al., 2012). This characteristic is, however, not truly 
“new”. Collaboration between governmental and non-governmental actors is also key in the 
somewhat older network governance literature (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997) and the 
more recent collaborative governance literature (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Second, where 
traditional governance arrangements are often based on direct regulation, financial incentives 
or communication, NEG often integrates these forms into innovative arrangements that are 
expected to achieve far more than the sum of their parts (Hoffmann, 2011). Again, it is 
questionable whether these characteristics are truly “new” to governance theorising. Scholars 
such as Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky already have argued for policy arrangements 
that build on a mix of incentives in their famous Smart Regulation (Gunningham & 
Grabosky, 1998). Third, NEG theorising takes into account that context matters and that local 
problems can best be addressed on a local level (Gunningham, 2009). Again, this idea of 
localism may be traced back to the earlier governance literature (Jordan, et al., 2005). Finally, 
due to its collaborative nature, participation in NEG arrangements is often voluntary, as 
compared to mandatory participation in more traditional governance arrangements. Again, 
one may question whether this truly is a “new” addition to the governance literature. After 
all, voluntarism in (environmental) governance has been the topic of a wide range of 
publications (Potoski & Prakash, 2009).  
 In combining these characteristics, NEG may, indeed, be considered a specific strand 
in the governance literature that seeks to understand the performance of governance 
arrangements that (i) have been developed in collaborations between governmental and non-
governmental actors, (ii) build on mixed incentives for participation, (iii) in which 
participation is voluntary, and (iv) that seek to address (local) problems with local solutions.  
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3.1 Examples of NEG in the building sector 
Two examples of NEG arrangements discussed in the current article may give some 
clarification of what real-world NEG arrangements look like in the building sector.  
The Better Building Partnership, is a collaboration of Sydney’s major property owners 
and the Sydney City Council which aims to improve the environmental performance of the 
city’s commercial property (which currently accounts for about 50% of the city’s carbon 
emissions). Through the Better Building Partnership, the Council learns how it can support 
property owners in terms of reducing legal barriers to, and the financial risks of, 
environmental upgrades to commercial property. The Council gains, as property owners make 
public commitments to reduce carbon emissions significantly beyond Australian legislature. 
The property owners learn from each other about how to cost-effectively reduce carbon 
emissions, and gain by seeing existing legal barriers removed and financial risks reduced. 
Participants praise the arrangement in terms of: (i) the relatively short two-year period of 
development, as contrasted with the lengthy process of having Australian building regulations 
changed; and, (ii) peer-pressure between the property owners (a) to participate, (b) to make 
far-reaching commitments in terms of reducing carbon emissions, and (c) to comply with 
these. Such peer-pressure is expected to add to the effectiveness of the Partnership, as well as 
to its accountability. 
Another example is the Energy Leap in the Netherlands (‘Energie Sprong’). Energy 
Leap aims to stimulate a transition to energy neutral buildings. It was developed by the Dutch 
Government in collaboration with a number of non-profit organisations. Its administration is 
commissioned by the Dutch Government to Platform31, a non-governmental organisation that 
seeks to develop knowledge on urban and regional development, and create networks between 
government, businesses and civil society. Under Energy Leap individuals and organizations, 
both public and private sector organisations, can submit their building projects for support to 
Platform31. Development or retrofitting projects to be supported are selected based on a 
number of specified criteria, mostly related to their level of ambition and innovativeness. 
Support comes in the form of hands-on information as well as financial support from the 
Dutch Government. By bringing together and supporting the leaders in the market Energy 
Leap aims to achieve concrete results, draw lessons, and disseminate knowledge about good 
practices. A highly accessible website is maintained (www.energiesprong.nl) that presents 
best-practices, a series of research reports, and information on how to apply for (financial) 
support. The arrangement is praised by its administrators and participants in terms of: (i) the 
position of Platform31 as an independent organisation between government, market and civil 
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society; and, (ii) the flexibility in the arrangement to reward, target and stimulate leadership in 
the industry. Particularly the role of the independent Platform31 is considered to strengthen 
the accountability of the arrangement. 
 
4 Towards a better understanding of NEG: NEG arrangements in Australia and 
the Netherlands  
Australia and the Netherlands provide intriguing contexts for a study of NEG. First of all, 
these countries have adopted NEG, which provides a pool from which cases can be selected. 
Secondly, the countries provide for a number of differences in the contexts of these NEG 
arrangements that may help to better understand their outcomes: (i) where the Netherlands is 
traditionally considered a leader in terms of environmental governance and having a culture 
of citizen awareness in terms of sustainability, Australia is a less positive example in such 
terms (Esty & Porter, 2005; Jordan, et al., 2005); and, (ii) where the Netherlands has been 
severely affected by the global financial crisis of 2008 (and the Euro-crisis that followed), 
Australia has done remarkably well in terms of economic development 
(http://econ.worldbank.org/). This may shed some light on how these important contextual 
characteristics affect the development and performance of NEG arrangements. 
 
4.1 Research design 
In Australia and the Netherlands a wide range of NEG arrangements have emerged against 
the (legal) backdrop of building regulations that lack ambition in terms of environmental 
sustainability (cf., Thomas, 2010; Van Bueren & Priemus, 2002). These arrangements 
address the carbon intensity of new or existing buildings, but all have a different approach to 
doing so. To give a broad brush overview before zooming in on the details in Section 5, the 
disparate NEG arrangements address different aspects of the larger, complex policy problems 
that the building sector poses. They have unpacked these complex problems into smaller and 
more manageable problems, and specific problem owners have come together to solve these. 
Among these, the problems of regulatory failure, split-incentives, conflicting interests, and 
the vicious circle of blame are addressed in a variety of ways, which will be discussed and 
evaluated.  
To gain insight into whether and how NEG lives up to its assumed promises this 
article studies 20 NEG arrangements (14 in Australia, 6 in the Netherlands) such as the Better 
Buildings Partnership and Energy Leap. This stratified sample canvasses the type and 
content of a larger population of NEG arrangements that have been introduced globally 
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(Backstrand, et al., 2010; Hoffmann, 2011; Holley, et al., 2012). The 20 cases were selected 
based on an extensive internet search using key words such as “sustainable development 
AND Australia”, “sustainable building AND Australia”, “green building AND Australia”, 
“sustainable construction AND Australia”, and “green construction AND Australia”.  
In order to understand the development process of these NEG arrangements, their 
particular form, and implementation a series of in-depth face-to-face interviews was carried 
out. Interviewees were targeted using snowball sampling and were selected for their expert 
knowledge of, and experience with, one or more of the NEG arrangements studied. This 
sampling resulted in a pool of 80 interviewees from various backgrounds – i.e. policy makers, 
administrators, investors, developers, architects, engineers, and property owners. Table 1 
provides an overview of the interviewees. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
Interviews were based on a semi-structured questionnaire which provided a 
framework of checks and balances to assess the validity of findings (cf. Silverman, 2001). 
They were recorded and transcribed into a report that was sent back to interviewees for 
validation. Note that interviewees were often aware of, and involved in, more than one NEG 
arrangement. This allowed me discuss each arrangement, on average, with five participants. 
The data were processed by means of a systematic coding scheme, and qualitative data 
analysis software (Atlas.ti). The coding was carried out in three rounds, from ‘roughly’ 
coding parts of interviews where interviewees discussed for instance the outcomes of an 
arrangement, to ‘fine-grained’ coding within earlier identified codes when interviewees for 
instance discussed whether an arrangement was considered effective because it had resulted 
reduced carbon emissions (Appendix A provides an overview of the systematic coding 
scheme). Using this approach, the data was systematically explored, and insight was gained 
into the ‘repetitiveness’ and ‘rarity’ of experiences shared by the interviewees. Finally, to 
cross-check the validity of the data and findings, a document study of existing information on 
these NEG arrangements and existing research on NEG was carried out. 
  
5 Research findings 
Table 2 links the 20 NEG arrangements studied to the main problem they aim to overcome. It 
further links the specific NEG arrangements to those most affected by the problem, referred 
to as problem owners; and the approach chosen for addressing these problems. The 
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arrangements will be discussed below, structured according to the specific problem they seek 
to address. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.1 Split incentives between property owners and tenants 
Tenants often have limited incentives to make improvements to the buildings they use since 
the pay-back time of an improvement is normally longer than their lease, and landlords not 
often allow their tenants to make changes to their buildings (Golove & Eto, 1996). CitySwitch 
Green Office addresses these issues. This NEG arrangement aims to make Australian office 
tenants aware of the energy they use and how they can reduce this. It is administrated by local 
councils and state governments and serves as a platform for office tenants to learn about 
energy efficiency, share information, network, and showcase good practices. The 
arrangement aims to show tenants that there are limits to what they can do by changing work 
processes or making changes to a building’s interior; and, that more may be expected if their 
landlord makes (significant) changes to the building as a whole. As well as informing tenants, 
this arrangement helps tenants to put pressure on their landlords to improve the 
environmental performance of their buildings. Individual tenants often have limited power in 
a tenant-landlord relationship; a collective of tenants has more power, and even more so 
when supported by a government agency. 
By participating in the arrangement, office tenants come to agreements with councils 
about their future environmental performance, and the council then provides support to help 
them meet these goals. In short, tenants agree to meet a particular rating within the voluntary 
National Australian Built Environment Rating System (NABERS), which seeks to the reduce 
energy and water consumption of existing buildings (NSW Government, 2011). Through 
linking the arrangement with this measurable goal, the risk of symbolic participation, or 
green wash (Lyon & Maxwell, 2006), is partly overcome. Certain councils provide financial 
support, others facilitate meetings and ensure an ongoing supply and distribution of 
information. In return for signing an agreement with a local council on future targets to be 
met, participants may use the promotional CitySwitch Green Office logo; and, awards have 
been introduced to recognise leading practice. The ability to showcase leadership is 
considered a strong driver for participation, as a CitySwitch administrator explains:  
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It is about leadership, it is about being seen to participate. … The [NEG 
arrangement] helps leaders to feel good about what it is they are doing, and to have a 
place to speak about it (#41).1 
 
The arrangement’s 2012 progress report claims that, compared to non-participants, 
CitySwitch participants ‘boast an above NABERS  rating’ (CitySwitch, 2013, 14). This 
would indicate that participants on average use less energy and water in their buildings than 
non-participants. It remains unclear, however, whether CitySwitch attracts highly ambitious 
participants in the first place (i.e., those who already have high ranking NABERS ratings), or 
whether they become ambitious through participating.  
 
5.2 Split incentives between current and future property owners 
Similarly, current property owners often lack an incentive to improve their property, as the 
pay-back time of an energy conserving improvement is often longer than the time they will 
own their properties – which holds all the more true for home owners (Golove & Eto, 1996). 
A traditional approach to overcoming this particular problem involves providing subsidies to 
property owners as an incentive to take away some of the financial barriers they experience. 
Such subsidies, however, have over the years faced severe criticism (Baldwin, Cave, & 
Lodge, 2011). The most relevant criticism here is (i) that such subsidies only give an 
advantage to those who are able to obtain and understand the information related to the 
subsidies, and (ii) that it is difficult to monitor and enforce the standards of such subsidies 
during implementation. Various stories about “rooftop cowboys in the solar industry”, where 
fraudulent contractors mislead homeowners about the costs of the instalment of solar panels 
(Peacock, 2013), underline this criticism. 
 Aiming to overcome these shortfalls in traditional subsidies, the Australian and Dutch 
governments seek to provide financial incentives but do so in the form of performance based 
grants, combined with information campaigns. Those seeking a grant must meet a certain 
                                                          
1 In line with the custom of qualitative social science research, interviewees provided me with their insights in 
confidence. As such I cannot provide the identities of my interviewees unless they have given me explicit 
approval for doing so. To give the reader insight to the variety of interviews I quote in this research essay I refer 
to them with a number (e.g. ‘#50’). Please note that this research essay reports on a study that sits within a larger 
study, which addresses more than the 20 NEG-arrangements discussed here, and based on more than the 80 
interviews used for the current research article. As such some interviewees are referred to with numbers higher 
than 80. 
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performance level, often within a specified time frame, and will face disciplinary measures if 
the performance is not met – e.g., the grant needs to be paid back to the grant providing 
organisation. Through intensive information campaigns the grant suppliers aim to reach and 
inform a large group of potential grantees about the possibilities and opportunities of the 
grants they supply – e.g., all 1.65 million households in the Australian state of Queensland 
under Climate Smart Living, and all 400+ housing corporations in the Dutch social rental 
sector under Sunny Rentals.  
Interviewees were however critical about these NEG arrangements. They questioned 
whether the information supplied to such large numbers of individuals, often through 
brochures or information websites, would persist over time (cf., Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, 
Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). This holds especially true for Climate Smart Living, which 
was concluded by the end of 2012 and thus lacks repeat encounters with participating 
households. With such large numbers of participants it also seems difficult to overcome the 
problem mentioned earlier, of monitoring and enforcement. The Climate Smart Living 
arrangement is criticized for a lack of efficiency exactly because it opened up opportunities 
for fraudulent practice, such as phony energy audits (Hurst, 2012). The sheer number of 
participants targeted also makes collaboration a complicated process. As an administrator 
from Sunny Rentals made clear: ‘It is difficult to implement something on a large scale and 
get everyone on board. There are so many different organisational foci, so many decision 
making processes, so many people involved’ (#93). In this arrangement the time intensive 
process of collaboration was eventually sacrificed for a less time intensive form of top-down 
steering. That change appears to have caused a number of initial collaborators to step away 
from the arrangement in its current form. 
 
5.3 Conflicting interests between government and property owners 
In achieving high overall energy conservation in the building sector, it is important to move 
beyond the level of individual buildings. The interaction of infrastructure such as electricity 
supply, waste collection, and transport of people and goods to and from buildings has an 
especially significant impact on the energy performance of the building sector as a whole. In 
making investments in future infrastructure, cities may wish to know whether property 
owners and developers are willing to move to higher performing buildings; and if so, what is 
needed for them to do so. Property owners may wish to be informed about the direction a city 
may take in its infrastructure investments and legislative framework before making 
investments to improve their buildings’ environmental performance. However, due to 
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commercial pressures it is often not in the interest of individual property owners or 
developers to (publicly) share information about their ambitions and wishes. 
This is what the Better Buildings Partnership, introduced above, aims to overcome. 
The Partnership was started in 2011, following examples in London and Toronto. The 
arrangement recognises that although commercial property owners have the ability to make 
major improvements to their individual buildings, they and the City of Sydney can achieve 
greater results if they collaborate. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the 
various parties stating that the property owners commit to the City’s vision (the Sydney 2030 
city plan) and that the City will support them in doing so. Although the City’s administrators 
of the Partnership were very enthusiastic about the opportunities it could provide, 
participants were less positive about the actual results achieved through the Partnership. 
Apart from signing the Memorandums of Understanding, participants do not yet appear to 
have taken much additional action. Being involved in the policy making process, public 
recognition, and peer-pressure for now appear to be strong drivers for property owners to join 
and participate. As a representative of one of the participating landlords highlighted:  
 
The value for us is in being at the table with our competitors and peers. I’m not sure 
what other value actually comes from the initiative than just being a part of what 
everybody is a part of at the moment (#44). 
 
 Another approach to overcoming conflicting interests between governments and 
property owners comes in the form of covenants. Although this type of NEG arrangement has 
achieved considerable uptake as a way to steer the environmental behaviour of businesses in 
the Netherlands (Zito, Bruckner, Jordan, & Wurzel, 2003) it was considered a rather novel 
approach in Australia. Through covenants, governments enter into agreements with an 
individual businesses or a particular area of the building sector (i.e., cement makers, timber 
producers) to find approaches by which the latter can improve their environmental 
performance. In the state of South Australia the government has signed Climate Sector 
Agreements with, among others, the cement sector, as well as with individual businesses such 
as major mining companies; and, under the Green Deals arrangement, the Dutch national 
government has entered into covenants with a range of individual businesses and local 
governments. A South Australian covenant between the government and mining company, 
for example, seeks to measure and report greenhouse gas emissions from the mining 
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company and explores a global agreement for the steel industry. At the same time it provides 
the company with (inter)national recognition as being a leader in the industry. 
Interestingly, different experiences were reported in the two countries. Interviewees in 
Australia were generally positive about the opportunities offered by covenants to both 
government and industry. Although interviewees mentioned the danger of capture related to 
such covenants (i.e. situations where the governed industry or business aims to see its private 
interest served over the public interest), they claimed that parties to the covenant feel pressure 
to comply with agreements made because covenants are often a public commitment between 
a government and a private party, which receives public attention through the (local) 
Australian media, and is normally publicly accessible on the internet. Only a small number of 
covenants have yet been signed.  
The narrative about covenants in the Netherlands, as shared by Dutch interviewees, 
was less positive. Participation in the Green Deals was considered substantial, with over 200 
proposals for covenants; yet, interviewees criticised the Green Deals for lacking ambition 
and a long-term structural approach to solving pressing environmental damage (#76). 
Covenants were understood to provide individual businesses and particular parts of the 
building sector the opportunity to circumvent the introduction of environmental regulation. 
By showcasing a willingness to come to a solution to address environmental damage, and 
through collaborative processes with governments, participants may keep government 
attention away from implementing regulatory requirements (cf., Reid & Toffel, 2009). 
Interviewees also reported difficulty for governments in enforcing covenants when the 
private party involved does not live up to its promises. Often the most ‘serious’ disciplinary 
measure for the government is to terminate the covenant, but that still leaves the government 
with  unaddressed environmental risks, and often much time lost in developing and 
implementing the covenant. In short, after over 20 years of experience with covenants in the 
Netherlands, it may very well be that the private parties entering into these covenants have 
learned how to manipulate the system and exploit the weaknesses of covenants (cf., De 
Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof, & In 't Veld, 2010). 
 
 
5.4 Conflicting interests between leaders and laggards in the industry 
It is often difficult to distinguish the high performing buildings of leaders in the building 
sector, from those of laggards in the industry. Building codes are often considered the lowest 
common denominator that buildings have to meet, and, as with many regulated sectors, 
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strong lobby groups aim to keep the regulatory requirements at low levels (Baldwin, et al., 
2011). This is in the interest of laggards in the industry, but not in the interest of the leaders. 
In both Australia and the Netherlands leaders in the industry have set up a series of best-of-
class benchmarking arrangements which allow buildings or building products to be compared 
against each other based on their environmental performance – i.e., Green Star and 
EnviroDevelopment in Australia, and BREEAM-NL in the Netherlands. These arrangements 
rate the environmental performance of buildings or products on a scale – e.g., a number of 
stars indicates a certain performance. The criteria against which buildings or products are 
assessed are set by the arrangement’s administrator, and assessment is generally carried out 
by a third party certifier. These arrangements generally leave it to the building owner or 
designer to choose a mixture of criteria to meet and reach a certain level of certification. 
Normally these arrangements set higher regulatory criteria than that required by a country’s 
building regulatory framework, and participation in these arrangements is voluntary.  
The major advantages of best of class benchmarking have been discussed elsewhere 
(e.g., Cooper & Symes, 2009) and are confirmed by interviewees in the current research: (i) it 
is left to participants what level of environmental performance is sought; (ii) it is left to 
participants how this performance is reached; (iii) by benchmarking buildings or products 
against each other consumers have easy access to information about the building or product’s 
environmental performance; and, (iv) for developers benchmarking is an attractive way of 
marketing a building’s environmental credentials, which may make them willing to 
participate. Similarly, the downsides of benchmarking have been widely discussed, and were 
also confirmed by interviewees in the current research: (i) there is a tendency of developers to 
achieve the highest certification against the lowest costs, for instance by installing features 
that get high scores in the certification process but do not necessarily fit a more holistic idea 
of environmental performance; (ii) many of the arrangements certify buildings based on their 
design, or construction, but not on their performance when in use.  
That said, this specific type of arrangement is the only one of all the studied 
arrangements that can be considered to have achieved significant numbers in terms of low-
carbon intensive buildings built or retrofitted. This holds especially true for the higher end of 
the commercial sector, and particular the higher end of the office market, as it is here where 
developers were said to see a market advantage in developing buildings with high levels of 
environmental performance. The arrangements are generally not considered to have much 
impact at the lower end of the commercial sector, or the residential sector in general. A senior 
manager at a major international development corporation explained:  
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In the top-end of the office market you have large tenants, major public 
companies or large private companies, who take multiple floors. They have 
made a public commitment to be a sustainable business. That’s driving it in 
terms of the outcomes of [benchmarking]. But in residential, the mums and 
dads, you don’t have groups of people who come in and say: ‘We all want to 
buy this.’ At best you get one person out of twenty having a desire to live in a 
building that is green. The proportion isn’t there yet  (#45).  
  
5.5 Developers blaming financing barriers 
Property owners often cannot find the necessary financing to upgrade their buildings. Banks 
are risk averse in supplying mortgages as the cost of upgrades are not (yet) represented in an 
increase in the buildings market value – i.e. the cost of the upgrade will be paid back by 
lower amenity costs, and expected higher rent rates (Pivo, 2010). 
Addressing this particular issue, the Cities of Melbourne and Sydney have introduced 
NEG arrangements based on tripartite financing. These NEG arrangements are referred to as 
1200 buildings in Melbourne and Environmental Upgrade Agreements in Sydney. In both 
cities the particular arrangements are founded on their overall city planning strategy. These 
NEG arrangements bring together local councils, a national bank, a major fund manager, the 
Australian Carbon Trust, and property owners in the cities’ central business districts. The 
NEG arrangements are a vehicle to allow the local councils to enter into agreements with 
building owners and finance providers as a way of funding works to improve the 
environmental performance of those buildings. Under these NEG arrangements, the finance 
provider lends funds to a local council, which then supplies these funds to a building owner 
for environmental upgrades to its buildings. These funds are repaid through a local council 
charge on the land – i.e. the local council charges a fee, which is used to pay the loan to the 
finance provider. The agreement states the future environmental performance that is to be 
achieved, and stipulates a time frame for achieving this result (NSW Government, 2010). 
The arrangements address problems faced by property owners in finding finance for 
retrofitting their buildings, but also help governments to achieve results in meeting their high 
targets. As an administrator of 1200 buildings explained: 
 
Voluntary [arrangements] need to come with a tangible benefit. If you step back a bit 
you find that governments need to find out what their value proposition is [i.e., what 
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is the financial incentive the government has to offer to participants?]. Without the 
[tripartite financing] our value proposition was limited to promotion, networks and 
knowledge.  The finance incentive has created a strong value proposition and 
something that many Melbourne building owners are interested in (#26). 
 
But, as with many of the examples discussed above, these arrangements have not yet 
achieved significant numbers in terms of participants or actual buildings retrofitted: less than 
10 Environmental Upgrade Agreements have been signed in Sydney; and, less than 50 
buildings currently participate in the 1200 buildings arrangements in Melbourne.2 
Another particular financial barrier discussed by developers are first mover 
disadvantages. These relate to the financial, legislative and cultural risks organisations face 
when bringing a new product or service to the market (Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010). The 
new product or service may be considered too expensive by clients; may conflict with 
existing legislation; or may face resistance when it is considered ‘ahead of its time’, or ‘too 
fast for the market’ (Robinson & Min, 2002). Addressing first-mover disadvantages through 
subsidies is a well-known approach in environmental governance (Stewart, 2006); for 
instance, the provision of subsidies to households and firms for the instalment of solar panels. 
Yet, as discussed above, questions have arisen as to how successful traditional subsidies are 
in improving environmental performance, and sometimes it is even argued that subsidies may 
be harmful in doing so (Pearce, Porter, Steenblik, Pieters, & Potier, 2003). Aiming to 
addressing these problems a range of Australian governments and the City of Amsterdam in 
the Netherlands are experimenting with best-performance grants. Best-performance grants 
challenge recipients to come up with innovative solutions to achieve high environmental 
performance of their (future) buildings. Competition between the grant-applicants is expected 
to continuously improve the environmental performance of the solutions they present to win 
grants. 
Typically these best-performance grants are initiated and administered by local 
governments. They are the result of a collaborative development process in which the 
governments work together with businesses and non-government organisations. A 
representative example is South Australia’s Buildings Innovation Fund, where the state 
government collaborates with the Adelaide City Council, the Property Council (a building 
sector interest group) and the University of South Australia in developing grant criteria and 
                                                          
2 Data from: administrators in Sydney, #39; #41; #42; and, Melbourne #26. 
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assessing applications. The strength of these grants, so explained a grant administrator, is that 
the outcomes provide ‘solid business cases that innovative solutions to reduce carbon 
emissions [in the building sector] can be cost-effective’ (#51). The weakness of the grants, 
however, relates to their often small budget. For instance, the total funds available for the 
City of Amsterdam under its competitive grant NEG arrangement are only 80 million Euro – 
keeping in mind that development projects often run up to tens if not hundreds of millions of 
Euros this grant will only be able to achieve limited results. 
 
5.6 Developers blaming regulatory barriers 
As well as providing funds to limit or take away first-mover financial risks, governments may 
support first-movers by removing legislative barriers (Frynas, Mellhali, & Pigman, 2006). 
The building sector is notorious for legislative barriers that stand in the way of improved 
environmental performance (Bond, 2011). For instance, with current technologies it is 
possible to reclaim and reuse wastewater; however, sewage and drinking-water regulations 
often prevent this technology being implemented (Power, 2010).   
Through Green Door the Queensland Government aims to provide regulatory relief to 
applicants of development proposals that aim to be leaders in terms of environmental 
performance. The Queensland Government works collaboratively with the development 
industry, local governments and referral agencies to identify the most sustainable 
development proposals in Queensland, and helps these to overcome regulatory barriers. 
Normally these relate to developers seeking to use innovative materials that are not yet 
accepted under current regulations. Under this NEG arrangement, development proposals that 
are identified as ‘the most sustainable in Queensland’ are fast-tracked in order to ensure 
‘exemplary sustainable developments delivered sooner throughout Queensland’ (Queensland 
Government, 2011, 4). Or, in the words of a representative of a property and development 
interest group:  
  
It was an acknowledgement that if they [the government] want to reach a certain 
state of outcomes, they need to make it easier for the people to go through the 
system (#31). 
 
But again, in practice only a small number of developers were found to make use of 
Green Doors. This only stresses the conservative nature of the building sector, as 
discussed earlier.  
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5.7 In summary 
In summary, in addressing a range of complex policy problems in the building sector a wide 
range of NEG arrangements have been introduced in Australia and the Netherlands. What 
binds these arrangements together is that (i) participation in all these arrangements is non-
mandatory; (ii) they aim to achieve energy conservation in the building sector by overcoming 
particular barriers; (iii) they all move beyond existing regulatory requirements related to 
energy conservation and carbon emission reductions in the Australian building sector; and, 
(iv) local governments often play key-roles in their development or implementation. 
However, with the exception of best-of-class benchmarking none of the arrangements studied 
has thus far achieved substantial outcomes in terms of buildings constructed or retrofitted 
with high levels of environmental performance. 
 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
This article questioned whether and how NEG arrangements can adequately address complex 
regulatory barriers and market shortfalls. Before coming to a conclusion about these issues, 
some caution is needed. The research approach that is chosen inevitably results in limitations 
as to the reach of the conclusions drawn. The research is exploratory and descriptive in nature 
and is predominantly based on the experiences of informed and involved actors, and builds 
on cases from the building sector only. More research on NEG in other sectors will be needed 
to assess the reach of the conclusions drawn here. Therefore, the insights and conclusions that 
follow do not claim empirical generalisation, but may provide bounded insights into ‘basic 
patterns, or tendencies, so that other studies are likely to find something similar but not 
identical’ – i.e., moderatum generalisation (Payne & Williams, 2005, 297).  
 
6.1 General critique of NEG: much potential, limited outcomes  
To what extent do the NEG arrangements studied hold the potential to overcome complex 
policy problems? Interviewees generally agreed that NEG has considerable potential to 
reduce carbon emissions in the building sector by addressing these policy problems, but they 
also pointed to the relatively poor performance of the various arrangements studied. Some 
typical insights are provided in table 3. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
19 
 
The wider problem of significant carbon emissions in the building sector can, as shown in 
this article, be unpacked into smaller problems. In assigning these unpacked, smaller 
problems to specific problem owners, tailored policies may be developed and implemented. 
As compared to traditional government-led governance (i.e., direct regulation), such tailored 
policies may find a greater capacity, between the abilities of both governmental and non-
governmental actors, to adequately address policy problems. In the NEG arrangements 
studied, leaders in the industry, large property owners, building tenants and governmental 
agencies worked together to find solutions to regulatory failure, split-incentive barriers, 
conflicting interests and the circle of blame that are attractive and workable for all the parties 
involved. The interviewees were, generally, positive about this potential of NEG 
arrangements. 
However, and although information on the outcomes of the arrangements studied, in 
terms of reduced carbon emissions, is limited, a compilation of the available ‘performance’ 
data provides a somewhat worrisome picture of the arrangements’ performance. Most of the 
arrangements studied attracted only a limited number of participants or have resulted in a 
limited number of buildings with high levels of environmental performance. Only best-of-
class benchmarking arrangements have resulted in the construction of substantial numbers of 
buildings with high levels of environmental performance. However, they have only done so 
at the top end of the office market in Australia and the Netherlands (see also below). This 
type of arrangement has thus far been unable to affect the bulk of the building sector.  
The general lack of meaningful outcomes in NEG arrangements is in line with a lack 
of performance of such arrangements that has been identified in the larger ‘new’ and 
voluntary environmental governance literature (e.g., Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Karkkainen, 
2004; Potoski & Prakash, 2009; Schout, Jordan, & Twena, 2010). The presented study 
provides some insight how this general poor performance may be improved. 
 
6.2 How to improve NEG performance? 
Why have the NEG arrangements studied not delivered on their expected outcomes? In what 
follows, three main insights from the study are provided that suggest strategies to improve 
NEG performance in the building sector as well as in other sectors. For each insight, a 
number of exemplary quotes from the interviews are provided. 
 
Combine voluntary NEG arrangements with mandatory requirements to ensure better 
(future) outcomes; and use NEG arrangements to test (future) mandatory requirements. 
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TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Perhaps the most intriguing insight is that the interviewees questioned one of NEG’s key 
characteristics: its generally voluntary nature. The majority of the interviewees (60%) 
suggested that these voluntary NEG arrangements need to be reinforced by mandatory 
requirements in order to be able to achieve significant results on a large scale and in a timely 
manner; table 4 provides some typical insights. Interviewees considered that the set of NEG 
arrangements studied has provided insightful lessons on how governmental actors and non-
governmental actors can collaborate, as well as insights on what particular incentives work 
for the various parties in the building sector.  
This latter insight is especially important for the performance of NEG more generally. 
NEG arrangements can be approached as a strategy to develop and test future regulation. The 
evidence base of NEG arrangements possibly allows for the improvement of current 
regulatory requirements and the development of (future) regulations that build on different 
incentives for different parties in the building sector – as compared to the oft one-size-fits-all 
approach of current building regulation (see further Section 2). 
 
Use NEG arrangements as a tailored approach in addressing regulatory barriers and market 
shortfalls, not as a one-size-fits-all solution 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
By and large, the interviewees believed that the top end of the office market in the central 
business districts of the larger-sized Australian and Dutch cities is currently sufficiently 
involved in these arrangements; table 5 provides some typical insights. The NEG 
arrangements that were considered to perform best are best-of-class benchmarking tools such 
as Green Star, EnviroDevelopment and BREEAM-NL. For the top end of the office market, 
the significant financial gains that can be achieved through an arrangement may very well be 
the major driver for active participation and related positive NEG outcomes. Buildings that 
are certified under benchmarking arrangements can be marketed as better, in one way or the 
other, than comparable buildings with lower levels of certification or without certification. 
Interviewees predominantly referred to occupants and owners of (future) buildings with high-
levels of certification as being interested in such marketing of their buildings from a 
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corporate social responsibility point of view (cf., Kemper & Martin, 2010). In addition, in the 
top end of the commercial market, leadership matters, as the interviewees explained. NEG 
arrangements can acknowledge such leadership; particularly, the attention (local) 
governments give to the leaders in their NEG arrangements may be an incentive for 
participation.  
Yet at the lower end of the office market, in less profitable locations in the non-major 
cities and in the residential sector, NEG arrangements were found to be less successful. Here, 
the financial gains for participants appear to be much lower, possibly too low to provide an 
attractive incentive for participation. Also, the interviewees argued, in these parts of the 
building sector, NEG arrangements built on marketability may not be the most suitable 
strategy. After all, homeowners and small and medium-sized businesses may feel less 
pressure (if any pressure at all) from their peers, shareholders and clients to showcase their 
environmental credentials. Also, in this part of the building sector, leadership was considered 
less relevant by the interviewees for similar reasons. 
This insight further stresses that the performance of NEG arrangements is limited by 
their designs and contexts. It also gives a more in-depth understanding of how the needs of 
(prospective) ‘clients’ of NEG arrangements need to be included in their designs. It is 
unlikely that one-size-fits-all arrangements will achieve high levels of effectiveness, and 
more is to be expected from arrangements that are tailored to the needs of their clients. 
  
Governments need to become more active in NEG arrangements, and in particular, in 
ensuring coherence and building bridges between various arrangements. 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
The interviewees considered (local) governments to be pivotal for improving the performance 
of NEG arrangements; table 6 provides some typical insights. First, and following from the 
above findings, the interviewees considered that (local) governments need to back the NEG 
arrangements up with mandatory requirements to ensure an uptake of the arrangements on a 
much larger scale.  
Second, the interviewees also considered that (local) governments need to become 
more active in attracting participants to NEG arrangements. They can do so by organising 
more meetings to inform potential participants about NEG arrangements or they can do so by 
providing clear(er) information about NEG arrangements on their websites. The latter may 
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attract participants, particularly when it becomes clear what exactly is in it for them. 
CitySwitch Green Office is an illustrative example of an NEG arrangement that shares much 
information, lessons and best-practices openly with all interested parties. 
Third, and perhaps most insightful, the individual NEG arrangements together make 
up a larger system of governance. Particularly, (local) governments can strongly influence 
this larger system of governance. They have the ability to bridge NEG arrangements in such a 
way that synergies between the arrangements are created. Of particular interest is the role the 
Sydney City Government plays in a number of NEG arrangements that were studied. It is, for 
instance, actively involved in the Better Building Partnership, Environmental Upgrade 
Agreements and CitySwitch Green Office. The first two arrangements address commercial 
property owners and the latter addresses commercial property tenants. The interviewees 
explained that, by bringing these various groups together in a single forum, they can, 
supported by the City of Sydney, discuss and address problems related to the environmental 
performance that these groups cannot solve individually. This is a clear example of how 
(local) governments may be facilitative in addressing the split-incentives discussed in Section 
2 of this article. In creating such synergies, (local) governments may seek to ensure that the 
whole of NEG arrangements is larger than the sum of its parts. 
The roles of government in NEG arrangements and their impact on the outcomes of 
these has been understudied in the current literature (cf., Bell & Hindmoor, 2009). The 
involvement of government in particular roles, however, seems pivotal for NEG success (cf., 
Koch, 2013) and may require more attention in future studies on NEG. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The current study indicates that NEG is not a panacea for addressing regulatory barriers and 
market shortfalls. They are limited by their design and context in achieving successful 
outcomes, and overall NEG does not appear to result in sweeping outcomes. This is not a 
novel insight in itself (Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Gunningham, 2009; Koehler, 2007). Yet, 
given all NEG activity in the building sector and in other sectors it may be of relevance to 
remind ourselves about the bounded effectiveness of NEG. The study has further pointed to a 
number of design and contextual characteristics that may help to improve (future) NEG 
arrangements. 
 What way forward then with NEG? Although the above findings seem to imply that 
more NEG arrangements are needed to achieve better results, there may be a saturation point 
for NEG arrangements. A set of NEG arrangements that is too large may result in 
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‘participation fatigue’ when participants become involved in different arrangements that all 
require time and effort and all address slightly different aspects of the same thing. 
Interviewees were also concerned that too much NEG activity may result in a race of the 
arrangements to the bottom. In order to be successful, these arrangements need a certain 
number of participants (Potoski & Prakash, 2009) and various arrangements may very well 
compete for participants. A danger thus exists that, under such competition, administrators of 
these arrangements may become more lenient or lower standards to make it easier for 
participants to become involved (ibid.). 
 Instead of introducing more and more new NEG arrangements, it may be better to 
begin singling out and scaling up those NEG arrangements that have proven to be successful 
in overcoming regulatory barriers and market shortfalls.  Governments may play key roles in 
this. Through marketing and the sharing of lessons learnt from these successful arrangements, 
governments may seek to increase the number of participants involved in them and to 
improve their performance. They may also seek to integrate these NEG arrangements in their 
regulatory frameworks, or to simply mandate participation in NEG arrangements that have 
proven to be successful. Finally, governments may further catalyse the performance of these 
particular arrangements by seeking synergies among them. 
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Tables  
Table 1 – Interviewees’ background 
 
Interviewee background Government Non-government 
Policy maker 8 (4 Australian/4 
Dutch)  
 
Administrator 26 (22 Australian 
/4 Dutch) 
15 (12 Australian 
/3 Dutch) 
Architect, engineer, advisor  11 (5 Australian /6 
Dutch) 
Contractor, developer  7 (3 Australian /4 
Dutch)  
Property owner  7 (4 Australian /3 
Dutch) 
Other  6 (3 Australian /3 
Dutch) 
Total 34 (26 Australian 
/8 Dutch) 
46 (27 Australian 
/19 Dutch) 
 
 
Table 2 – The specific problems addressed by the studied NEG arrangements, the problem 
owners involved, and their approaches to addressing the problems. 
 
Specific 
problem 
Problem 
owners 
NEG 
arrangement 
(reach and year 
of 
implementation)* 
Approach  Role of government 
in arrangement 
Split-
incentives 
between 
property 
owners and 
tenants 
 
Tenants of 
existing 
commercial 
buildings 
CitySwitch Green 
Office (Australia-
wide; 2010) 
Information 
networks 
combined with 
empowerment 
CitySwitch: initiator 
and administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Split-
incentives 
Current 
building 
Climate Smart 
Living 
Performance 
grants 
Climate Smart Living: 
initiator and 
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between 
current and 
future 
property 
owners 
owners (Queensland; 
2009); Sunny 
Rentals 
(Netherlands wide; 
2011); Energy 
Leap (Netherlands 
wide; 2011) 
combined with 
information 
supply 
administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Sunny Rentals: 
financial support for 
participants. 
Energy Leap: initiator 
and administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Conflicting 
interests 
between 
government 
and property 
owners 
Government Better Building 
Partnership 
(Sydney; 2011) 
Elite networks 
combined with 
regulatory 
relief 
Better Building 
Partnership: initiator 
and administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
  Climate Sector 
Agreements (South 
Australia; 2009); 
Green Deals 
(Netherlands wide; 
2011);  
Covenants Climate Sector 
Agreements: initiator 
and administrator of 
arrangement. 
Green Deals: initiator 
and administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Conflicting 
interest 
between 
leaders and 
laggards 
Leaders in 
the industry 
Green Star 
(Australia wide; 
2003); 
EviroDevelopment 
(Australia wide; ); 
Sustainable Port 
Development 
(Ports of Sydney; 
2006); BREEAM-
NL (Netherlands 
wide; 2011) 
Best of class 
benchmarking 
 
Green Star: joint-
initiator of 
arrangement. 
EnviroDevelopment: 
joint-initiator of 
arrangement; financial 
support for 
arrangement in first 
years. 
Sustainable Port 
Development: indirect 
support (financial). 
BREEAM-NL: joint-
initiator of 
arrangement. 
  ESCos Energy Service ESCos: financial 
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(Netherlands wide; 
2010) 
Companies support for 
development of 
contract. 
Circle of 
blame 
(developers 
blaming 
financial 
barriers) 
Owners of 
existing 
commercial 
buildings 
1200 Buildings 
(Melbourne; 
2010); 
Environmental 
Upgrade 
Agreements 
(Sydney; 2011) 
Financial 
intercession 
1200 Buildings: 
initiator and 
administrator of 
arrangement. 
Environmental 
Upgrade Agreements: 
initiator and 
administrator of 
arrangement. 
 Developers, 
builders and 
owners of 
new and 
existing 
commercial 
buildings; 
and new and 
existing 
residential 
buildings  
Building 
Innovation Fund 
(South Australia; 
2011); Sustainable 
Development 
Grant (Brisbane; 
2009); Smart 
Green Apartments 
(Sydney; 2012); 
Lord Mayor Grant 
(Brisbane; 2011); 
Zero Carbon 
Challenge (South 
Australia; 2011); 
Sustainability 
Fund (State of 
Victoria; 2005); 
Amsterdam 
Investment Fund 
(Amsterdam; 
2011) 
Best-
performance 
grants 
Building Innovation 
Fund: initiator and 
administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Sustainable 
Development Grant: 
initiator and 
administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Smart Green 
Apartments: joint-
initiator and 
administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Lord Mayor Grant: 
initiator and 
administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Zero Carbon 
Challenge: initiator 
and administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
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participants. 
Sustainability Fund: 
initiator and 
administrator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Amsterdam Investment 
Fund: initiator of 
arrangement, financial 
support for 
participants. 
Circle of 
blame 
(developers 
blaming 
regulatory 
barriers) 
Developers 
and future 
owners of 
new 
commercial 
and 
residential 
buildings 
Green Door 
(Queensland; 
2011); Green 
Strata (Australia 
wide; 2011)  
Regulatory 
relief 
Green Door: initiator 
and administrator of 
arrangement. 
Green Strata: 
financial support for 
arrangement in first 
years. 
 
* An overview of all NEG arrangements studied is available from 
www.EnviroVoluntarism.info 
 
Table 3 – Some typical insights 
Interviewee Quote 
#50 The failing of [this NEG arrangement] has been that it promised big 
reductions in carbon emissions, but up to now, this has not been realised [due 
to a lack of participation]. With [mandatory] carbon pricing as an addition [it] 
may be sped up. 
#51 What you often found was that these reports [on energy efficiency measures to 
be taken (these reports are part of a NEG arrangement)] ended up on the shelf 
and no follow-up action was taken. 
#66 There were issues with how the [NEG arrangement] was implemented. At 
first, it was all pilots. But you have to scale it up [which was not done]. If you 
don’t, you won’t generate the change we are all looking for 
#75 The biggest problem here in (…) is that we are absolutely not focused on 
results and learning. We like to start new pilot studies and experiments [with 
NEG arrangements], but we do not care about their results 
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Table 4 – Some typical insights 
Interviewee Quote 
#32 It is not the norm [yet]. Most companies don’t offset their emissions under a 
voluntary [NEG arrangement]. Most organisations won’t do it unless they are 
mandated to do it. 
#33 The speed with which we react is out of sync with the problems we face. 
Although a lot of voluntary [NEG arrangements] make sense, they are not fast 
enough in addressing problems. Regulation is needed. 
#41 Mandatory is the way to go. And that probably is a funny answer from 
somebody who runs a voluntary [NEG arrangement]. Well, there probably is 
room for both, but if we make the changes in the timeline we need to make 
them, then we’ve got to toughen up here. 
 
Table 5 – Some typical insights 
Interviewee Quote 
#43 The top end of any market does need to demonstrate leadership in certain 
areas. That is why they are the top end. (…) One of these credentials [to 
showcase leadership] is to be environmentally sensible and understand those 
issues. So that’s a criteria that more people and more people [seek to] meet [by 
joining NEG arrangements]. 
#30 Why isn’t everyone [participating in NEG arrangements]? For some large 
corporations, it comes down to corporate sustainability reporting. For some of 
our industrial members, it comes down to the fact that they want to attract 
global companies that have performance requirements about being positioned 
in an environmentally sustainable state, or something like that. (…) But [that] 
obviously [is] only a certain part of the market. 
#64 It all boils down to [the question of] who wants a sustainable building? Project 
developers and investors work from their current risk profiles. High-end 
tenants ask for sustainable buildings. They need [a building acknowledged 
under a NEG regime] to meet their CSR [corporate responsibility targets]. To 
put it in their CSR reports. These people want to pay for it. The residential 
sector is complicated. Homeowners and users don’t ask for sustainability. 
 
Table 6 – Some typical insights 
Interviewee Quote 
#78 There’s much uncertainty in the industry. There are so many certificates and 
[other NEG arrangements] around. People have a hard time understanding 
what is required in terms of sustainability. The government may take up a role 
of streamlining all this. We don’t need more fragmentation. 
#24 We [a government agency] make sure to get the minimum level [for 
sustainable construction] set and have buildings achieve this. We don’t have a 
problem if you wish to go above and beyond this. It would be nice if there was 
29 
 
some harmonisation between the different [NEG arrangements]. [Arrangement 
X] already builds on the [mandatory] codes. I think it is good to have that 
consistency. 
#75 As an organisation like ours [an agency at arm’s length of government], you 
are able to significantly influence the market. Even without financial 
incentives, much can be achieved by connecting people and organisations and 
by collecting and circulating insights [from NEG arrangements]. You know, 
we are a recognised name. [The building sector considers] us an independent 
and trustworthy source of information. 
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Appendix A – codes used for data analysis 
The list below are the codes used for analyzing the data. The data was coded in three stages. 
First a rough coding was carried out (bold codes). Second an intermediate coding was carried 
out (underlined codes). And finally, a fine grained coding was carried out (codes in italics). 
Codes are derived from an extensive review of the literature (Anonymous, 2012). 
 Development process 
Collaboration/participation 
Consensus building 
Deliberation/discussion/dialogue 
Heterarchy  
Devolved decision making 
Context based 
Ongoing learning and readjustment 
 
Arrangement structure 
Flexibility 
Transparency 
Soft law mechanisms 
Target and result orientation 
Clear rules 
Adaptable rules 
Enforcement and monitoring 
Self-monitoring 
Administered monitoring 
Third party monitoring 
Government monitoring 
Sanctioning 
Warning 
Financial penalty 
Reputational penalty (shaming) 
Rewards 
Information 
Interaction with government 
Public recognition 
Financial gain 
 
Outcome 
Effective 
Improving environmental 
performance 
Reducing CO2 emissions 
Not effective 
Too slow for change 
Mandatory is needed 
Efficient 
Cost-effective 
Not efficient 
 
Development motivations 
Affirmative 
Showcasing good practice 
Cheaper than formal regulation 
Cost savings 
Green consumers 
Green financing 
Negative 
Prevent future regulation 
Hindering competitors 
Societal pressure 
Worker pressure 
Industry characteristics 
Innovative industry 
Strong internal competition 
Strong international focus 
High organizational capability 
 
Participation motivations 
Affirmative 
Altruism 
Showcasing good practice 
Cost savings (general) 
Energy cost savings 
Green consumers 
Green financing 
Regulatory relief 
Negative 
Peer-pressure 
Societal-pressure 
Reputational harm 
Liability and legitimacy 
Poor past performance
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